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Abstract Pay-for-performance approaches have been widely adopted in order to
drive improvements in the quality of healthcare provision. Previous studies evaluat-
ing the impact of these programs are either limited by the number of health outcomes
or of medical conditions considered. In this paper, we evaluate the effectiveness of
a pay-for-performance program on the basis of five health outcomes and across a
wide range of medical conditions. The context of the study is the Lombardy region
in Italy, where a rewarding program was introduced in 2012. The policy evaluation is
based on a difference-in-differences approach. The model includes multiple depen-
dent outcomes, that allow quantifying the joint effect of the program, and random
effects, that account for the heterogeneity of the data at the ward and hospital level.
Our results show that the policy had a positive effect on the hospitals’ performance in
terms of those outcomes that can be more influenced by a managerial activity, namely
the number of readmissions, transfers and returns to the surgery room. No significant
changes which can be related to the pay-for-performance introduction are observed
for the number of voluntary discharges and for mortality. Finally, our study shows ev-
idence that the medical wards have reacted more strongly to the pay-for-performance
program than the surgical ones, whereas only limited evidence is found in support of
a different policy reaction across different types of hospital ownership.
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1 Introduction
Quality improvement is the principal strategy of any healthcare system. For this rea-
son, there is a strong focus on assessment and redesign of the work process and of the
systems themselves in order to lower the costs and to deliver care that is safer and that
results in the best outcome for patients. The adoption of a pay-for-performance (P4P)
approach aims to drive the hospitals in this direction. The idea behind the implemen-
tation of a P4P approach is quite simple: in order to improve the overall quality de-
livered, healthcare providers are given the opportunity to have their reimbursements
increased when they achieve specified quality benchmarks (Eijkenaar et al, 2013, Al-
shamsan et al, 2010). From an economics perspective, the hospital is considered as
a profit maximizer agent which is encouraged to compete for quality in order to ob-
tain a financial reward, rather than to attract more patients. Therefore, a P4P program
is considered efficient when an improved quality of care is achieved with equal or
lower costs for the overall healthcare system (Emmert et al, 2012). Clearly the evalu-
ation of the quality delivered is a crucial part to every P4P approach. While quality in
healthcare is a broad concept composed of different dimensions, such as efficiency,
evaluation of standard, appropriateness and customer satisfaction, P4P programs re-
fer to the healthcare system’s quality mostly in terms of its effectiveness (Van Herck
et al, 2010a).
Due to the potential of P4P programs, in recent years there has been a growing
interest in the application of these programs to the healthcare systems of different
countries. These studies are collected in several systematic reviews (Van Herck et al,
2010b, Eijkenaar, 2012, Petersen et al, 2006), but mixed results transpire about the
impact of the programs to the quality of care. The aim of the current paper is to con-
tribute to the existing literature by providing a thorough evaluation of a P4P program
and its effect on the overall quality of the healthcare system. The study discussed in
this paper pertains the Lombardy region (in Italy), previously identified as a suitable
context for the adoption of P4P program (Castaldi et al, 2011). In 2012, a tailored P4P
program was introduced to control the amount of the annual budget provided to each
hospital on the basis of their effectiveness. In order to assess the effects of the policy’s
introduction, an appropriate experimental setting was considered. In line with the de-
signs adopted by previous studies (Rosenthal et al, 2005, Lindenauer et al, 2007),
nine hospital wards covering a wide range of medical conditions were exogenously
selected for the treatment group, and were subjected to the P4P program, whereas the
other hospital wards were not involved in the program. Data were collected both two
years prior and two year post introduction of the policy. The aim of this paper is then
to evaluate the effect of the policy on the basis of the data collected.
The experimental design used suggests the choice of a difference-in-differences
(DID) approach for the evaluation of the policy impact (Blundell and Costa Dias,
2000). As data are available also two year post introduction of the policy, our analy-
sis can reveal a possible delayed impact of the P4P program. In this way, we extend
the existing literature with an evaluation of the impact beyond the immediate P4P
introduction.
As in the evaluation of any policy, a choice needs to be made about which health
outcome to use for quantifying the impact of the P4P program. In many studies, a
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single outcome is considered. For example, in England, Sutton et al (2012) quantify
the impact of the P4P adoption by analysing the hospital overall mortality. In addi-
tion, many studies make a choice of specific clinical conditions for the evaluation,
such as the acute myocardial infarction (AMI) or the coronary artery bypass graft
surgery (CABG) (Jha et al, 2012, Levin-Scherz et al, 2006, Glickman et al, 2007,
Shih et al, 2014). Differently to these studies, we analyse the P4P effect using five
different health outcomes and based on the overall case-mix hospitalizations of the
wards considered. This setting requires the use of advanced statistical methods that
can account, on the one hand, for the dependencies between the health outcomes and,
on the other hand, for the heterogeneity of the data at the patient, ward and hospital
levels. In this way, we provide an extensive and thorough evaluation of the program.
Moreover, for the first time in a P4P study, we investigate the policy effect with re-
gards to hospital ownership, by evaluating possible different reactions to the P4P
program among the private (for-profit and not-for-profit) and public providers, and
also with regards to the different wards, by evaluating whether surgical and medical
wards reacted differently to the policy.
The article proceeds as follows: in Section 2 we describe the healthcare system in
Lombardy and the adopted P4P program; in Section 3 we present the data used in
the analysis and in Section 4 we describe the chosen methodological approach; in
Section 5 we present and discuss the main results. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 The healthcare system and the P4P program in Lombardy
The Italian healthcare system provides universal healthcare coverage. The state gov-
ernment guarantees the Essential Levels of Assistance (LEA) over all regions of the
country. Each region has administrative and executive freedom of implementation of
the LEA, and citizens may freely choose the healthcare provider. The Italian NHS
is funded mainly from general taxation. Financial resources for NHS are transferred
from the state to a regional budget, and are then managed by the local healthcare
system (Martini et al, 2014). Among the 21 regions in Italy, Lombardy is one of the
top-ranked for socio-demographic indicators and one of the most competitive areas in
Europe according to economic indicators. Lombardy has a population of 10 million
residents, equal to 16% of the total Italian population, with a density of 404 inhabi-
tants per km2. The Lombardy healthcare system comprises of 150 hospitals generat-
ing 1.6 million discharges annually, with 18 billion Euro allocated for the healthcare
spending (75% of the regional budget) every year. A regional reform in 1997 radi-
cally transformed the healthcare system in Lombardy into a quasi-market healthcare
system in which citizens can freely choose the provider regardless of its ownership
(private for profit, private not for profit, or public). In most of the Italian regions, each
local health uthority is financed by its region under a global budget with a weighted
capitation system and the hospital-financing system based on the Diagnosis-Related
Groups (DRGs) is applied only to teaching hospitals. In contrast to the others regions,
the healthcare system in Lombardy is entirely built on a prospective payment system
based on DRGs, and the reimbursement is for all the providers within the regional
accreditation system. The 1997 reform also established that the Lombardy adminis-
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tration is responsible for monitoring the effectiveness of the healthcare provided by
health providers belonging to the regional accreditation system (Brenna, 2011). In
Lombardy, the budget assigned to each hospital is based on a two-stage bargaining
between the hospital and the regional officers (Martini et al, 2014). In the first agree-
ment, which takes place prior to the beginning of the financial year, the hospital’s
manager and the regional officer set the overall budget (a maximum reimbursement
based on the historical budget) that the region will allocate to the hospital. Hence,
the hospital’s manager can freely choose how to allocate the financial resources, i.e.
increasing some treatments and reducing others or assigning hospital’s resources in
the different wards according to the different remuneration levels provided by the
DRG-tariffs scheme. During the second accord, which takes place in the second half
of the financial year, the hospital’s management negotiates the extra budget and tries
to provide further treatments (Berta et al, 2013). The quality evaluation, based on
the measurement of clinical and economical results, is crucial in order to create a
”virtuous competition” among healthcare providers aimed to improve the effective-
ness and the efficiency of the services supplied. As a consequence, the Lombardy
regional healthcare directorate developed a set of performance measures to system-
atically evaluate the performance of the healthcare providers in terms of the quality
supplied. These performance measures comprise the following outcome measures:
(1) overall mortality (composed by intra-hospital mortality and mortality within 30
days after the discharge), (2) voluntary hospital discharges, (3) inter-hospital transfer
of patients, (4) return to the surgery room and (5) readmissions for the same major di-
agnostic categories. Every year, the evaluation’s results are published on a web portal,
which is accessible only to the hospitals included in the regional healthcare system.
The hospital management can access their performance results (at a ward level), and
can compare the results to the regional average performance. In addition, every year,
the regional manager organizes face-to-face meetings with the hospital manager to
discuss the evaluation’s results and to analyse the critical points in the hospital ac-
tivity. This kind of audit plays an important role in the improvement process for the
entire regional healthcare system.
On 1st of January 2012, a new policy was introduced, whereby the increment of
the hospital annual budget is based on the weighted mean of the hospital’s evalu-
ated outcomes. The adopted P4P program allocates the incentives by identifying six
groups of hospitals, which are homogeneous in terms of dimension and severity of
the treated patients. In each group, the hospitals are ranked according to a weighted
average of their performance in the effectiveness evaluation process. At this point,
the first hospital in the ranking receives an increment of 2% of its annual budget, the
worst one gets a penalty of 2%, whereas all the others receive an amount (between
the interval [−2%,+2%]) proportional to the distance between their score and the
score of the last hospital in the category’s ranking. In order to evaluate the effect of
the introduction of the P4P program on the healthcare system, the regional healthcare
management decided to split the wards between those that joined the new program
- the treated group - and the remaining wards - the control or untreated group. The
allocation of each ward into the groups is exogenous: it was done prior to the in-
troduction of the policy and nine wards were selected for the treated group, namely
cardiac surgery, cardiology, general surgery, general medicine, neurosurgery, neurol-
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ogy, orthopaedics, urology and oncology.
In view of this information, the aim of this paper is to assess whether there was an
improvement in the healthcare quality provided by the treated group compared to
the untreated group from the pre to the post-policy period, on the basis of all five
health outcomes described above. This question can be appropriately answered using
a multivariate DID approach. In the next section, we describe more in detail the data
available and the methodology chosen for the analysis.
3 Data
The database was gathered from the Lombardy healthcare information system. Data
were collected on patients admitted to 150 hospitals during the four years 2010-2013.
In this period the hospitals provided 3,581,389 hospitalisations, coded in the available
hospital discharge chart. In our analysis, we included patients admitted for acute care
and we excluded patients living outside the region, patients younger than two years
old or patients hospitalized in day-hospital, rehabilitation or palliative treatments.
Table 1 provides details for the variables considered in the study during the four years
(variable YEARS), two before and two in the policy-on period (variable POST). We
used variables both at the patient and ward/hospital level. At the patient level, there
is information on their gender (variable GENDER), age (variable AGE), number
of transit to the intensive care unit during hospitalization (variable INTCARE), the
weight of the financial reimbursement corresponding to the patient’s disease (variable
DRGWEIGHT) and the comorbidity index (variable COMORBIDITY). The latter is
measured as in Elixhauser et al (1998) and indicates the presence of one or more
additional diseases or disorders co-occurring with a primary disease or disorder. At
the hospital level, we know whether the hospital is affliated to a medical school in
which medical students receive practical training (variable TEACHING), whether
the hospital is mono-specialistic or general (variable SPECIALISED), and whether
there is presence in the ward of high-technology instrumentation (variable TECH-
NOLOGY). Moreover, we include the hospitals’ ownership (variable OWN), which
categorizes the hospital as private for profit, private not-for-profit or public, and we
distinguish wards whose prevalent activity is surgical from the medical ones (vari-
able SURGICAL). In order to quantify the policy effect, we have defined the variable
TREATED, which corresponds to the nine wards where the policy was applied. The
effectiveness of the policy is evaluated over the five health outcomes described in the
previous section, namely overall mortality (variable MORTALITY), number of trans-
fers to a different hospital (variable TRANSFERS), number of voluntary discharges,
which occur when the patient leaves the hospital against the medical advices (vari-
able VOLDISCH), number of returns to the surgery room (variable RETURN) and
number of repeated hospitalisations (variable READMISSIONS). We should clarify
that the outcome RETURN can be evaluated only for the surgical wards.
Table 1 reports the means for the variables in the dataset across the four years
of the study. The gender distribution is quite similar in the pre and the post periods,
with around 46% males admitted to the hospitals. The same trend can be observed
for the age of the patients (around 59 years-old), and for the DRG-weight (1.2%).
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Table 1: Sample means for the Lombardy hospital inpa-
tient stays before and after the policy introduction.
POST=0 POST=1
2010 2011 2012 2013
Patient
GENDER 0.457 0.459 0.460 0.461
(0.498) (0.498) (0.498) (0.498)
AGE 59.084 59.506 59.793 60.194
(21.185) (21.098) (21.088) (21.086)
INTCARE 0.050 0.053 0.053 0.054
(0.218) (0.223) (0.224) (0.226)
DRGWEIGHT 1.178 1.204 1.200 1.211
(1.056) (1.086) (1.068) (1.08)
COMORBIDITY 0.358 0.296 0.293 0.283
(0.695) (0.636) (0.633) (0.622)
Ward/Hospital
TECHNOLOGY 0.823 0.822 0.826 0.828
(0.382) (0.382) (0.379) (0.377)
TEACHING 0.252 0.253 0.255 0.254
(0.434) (0.435) (0.436) (0.435)
SPECIALISED 0.043 0.041 0.043 0.042
(0.202) (0.199) (0.202) (0.201)
SURGICAL 0.525 0.508 0.515 0.508
(0.499) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5)
OWN: NOPROFIT 0.089 0.089 0.092 0.091
(0.285) (0.285) (0.288) (0.288)
OWN: PROFIT 0.204 0.207 0.203 0.202
(0.403) (0.405) (0.402) (0.402)
OWN: PUBB 0.707 0.704 0.706 0.706
(0.499) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5)
TREATED 0.705 0.706 0.709 0.714
(0.456) (0.455) (0.454) (0.452)
Outcomes
TRANSFERS 0.011 0.010 0.005 0.005
(0.102) (0.102) (0.069) (0.068)
RETURN 0.048 0.050 0.014 0.015
(0.213) (0.218) (0.117) (0.121)
MORTALITY 0.050 0.051 0.052 0.051
(0.217) (0.22) (0.221) (0.219)
READMISSIONS 0.130 0.124 0.118 0.111
(0.336) (0.33) (0.323) (0.314)
VOLDISCH 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.007
(0.093) (0.09) (0.088) (0.086)
For each variable in the dataset, the mean for each year of the study is
reported in the table. Standard deviations in parentheses.
The percentage of comorbidities (roughly 30%) is relatively small compared to other
countries, but this is justified by the coding rules that affect the healthcare system
in Lombardy, whereby only the comorbidities directly connected with the treated
DRG are registered. Considering the variables related to the hospitals and the wards,
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we observe that the overall composition of the hospitals has not changed during the
policy period, with surgical wards covering around 51% of the overall admissions.
Moreover, 71% of the hospitalizations are provided by the public hospitals, whereas
30% of the patients are admitted to a private provider (20% in the for profit hospitals
and 9% in the not-for-profit). With regards to the health outcome measures, three out
of five (transfers, return to the surgery room and readmissions) show a reduction after
the introduction of the P4P program.
4 The Econometric Approach
We test the effect of the policy using a difference-in-differences (DID) approach
(Abadie, 2005, Blundell et al, 2004). The approach is suited to the experimental de-
sign used, as the wards are split into the treatment and the control group and the
allocation of the wards in one of these groups is exogenous, i.e. the groups are fixed
beforehand and the policy is applied only to the treatment group. The standard as-
sumptions of a DID approach are therefore satisfied: (a) the units do not switch be-
tween the control and the treatment group and any macro changes affect both groups
equally, (b) there are no spillover effects: the treatment group received the treatment
and the control group did not, and, (c) differences between treatment and control
group remain constant in the absence of treatment (parallel trend). The check of the
parallel trend assumption is going to be discussed later in the results section.
As in Martini et al (2014), the analysis is performed at the hospital ward level, at
which the policy was implemented. The five health outcomes described above are
first adjusted by patients characteristics via the use of a multilevel logistic mixed ef-
fect model (Snijders, 2011, Goldstein, 2011). This model allows to account for the
hierarchical structure of the data whereby patients are clustered into wards and wards
are nested into hospitals. In addition, the longitudinal structure of the data means that
a time effect is also to be expected.
In detail, letYpwht represent a binary health outcome for patient p (with p= 1, . . . ,Pwht )
in the ward w (with w= 1, . . . ,Wht ), belonging to the hospital h (with h= 1, . . . ,Ht ),
hospitalized at time t (in years, t = 2010, . . . ,2013). Let pipwht be the conditional
probability of Ypwht being equal to 1. We consider the model
ln
(
pipwht
1−pipwht
)
= α+ηXpwht +µwht +νht + εpwht , (1)
where η is a vector of coefficients for the Xpwht patient-level covariates described in
table 1. The parameter µwht is a random effect of the ward w nested within hospital h
at time t, capturing the latent heterogeneity of the wards, whereas the parameter νht
is the latent heterogeneity of the hospital h at time t. µwht and νht are independent
and identically distributed, N(0,σ2µ) and N(0,σ2ν ), respectively, and are assumed to
be uncorrelated with the regressors.
The model in equation (1) returns the patients’ predicted probabilities
pˆipwht =
exp(αˆ+ ηˆ Xpwht + µˆwht + νˆht)
1+ exp(αˆ+ ηˆ Xpwht + µˆwht + νˆht)
, (2)
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which we collapse at the ward level over time in order to obtain the average predicted
health outcome
HOwhtm =
∑p∈Pwhtm pˆipwht
|Pwhtm |
, (3)
where Pwhtm is the set of patients admitted in the ward w of the hospital h in the month
m (m= 1, . . . ,12) of the year t and |Pwhtm | is the cardinality of this set.
The aim is now to quantify the policy effect on the basis of the five (adjusted)
health outcomes. As we anticipate a correlation between the five health outcomes,
we consider a multivariate DID model, rather than a separate model for each out-
come. In this way, we are able to quantify the overall effect of the policy across all
health outcomes, as well as at the individual level. Let then HO(θ)whtm denote the health
outcome θ , namely readmissions (θ = 1), mortality (θ = 2), return to the surgical
room (θ = 3), transfers (θ = 4) and voluntary discharges (θ = 5), at month m of
year t (t = 2010, . . . ,2013) of ward w (w = 1, . . . ,Wh) belonging to hospital h (with
h= 1, . . . ,H). We consider the following multivariate mixed model:
HO(θ)whtm = α
(θ)
h + β
(θ)TREATEDwh + ∑2013j=2011 γ
(θ)
j I( j = t) +
∑2013j=2011 δ
(θ)
j (I( j = t) ·TREATEDwh) + υ(θ)MONTHtm + ε(θ)whtm , (4)
where the dummy variable TREATEDwh indicates whether the ward w is in the
treatment group or not, the indicator variable I( j = t) indexes the four years of the
study (two pre and two post policy), with 2010 set as reference category, MONTH
is a continuous variable, taking values 1 to 48 and added to correct for a possible
seasonality effect, α(θ)h is the random hospital effect for outcome θ , and the error
ε(θ)whtm = (ε
(1)
whtm , . . . ,ε
(5)
whtm) has a multivariate distribution εwhtm ∼ N(0,Σ), with the co-
variance Σ accounting for possible dependencies between the different outcomes. The
parameter δ (θ)j is of interest in this model. Under the assumption of a parallel trend
pre-policy, we expect δ (θ)2011 = 0 for all outcomes, whereas the parameters δ
(θ)
2012 and
δ (θ)2013 represent the DID of average outcomes between the treated and control wards
from the pre to the post-policy years. The two different parameters for the post-policy
period let us detect whether the impact of the policy was immediate in the first year
of its introduction or whether it was delayed in the second year (Ayyagari and Shane,
2015).
This model allows us to detect the effect of the policy across all wards and hos-
pitals. A second objective of the study is to detect whether the reaction to the P4P
adoption is different depending on the ward’s type. In particular, we group all wards
into two types: surgical and medical, and extend the model in equation (4) to:
HO(θ)whtm = α
(θ)
h + β
(θ)TREATEDwh + ∑2013j=2011 γ
(θ)
j I( j = t) +
∑2k=1λ
(θ)
k I(k = SURGICALwh) + ∑
2013
j=2011
(
δ (θ)j I( j = t) · TREATEDwh
)
+
∑2013j=2011∑
2
k=1
(
µ(θ)jk I( j = t) · I(k = SURGICALwh)
)
+
∑2k=1
(
ν(θ)k I(k = SURGICALwh) ·TREATEDwh
)
+
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∑2013j=2011∑
2
k=1
(
τ(θ)jk I( j = t) · I(k = SURGICALwh) ·TREATEDwh
)
+
υ(θ)MONTHtm + ε
(θ)
whtm , (5)
with the variable SURGICAL defined as 1 if the prevalent activity of the ward is
surgical and 0 otherwise. In this model, the DID parameters τ(θ)jk , j= 2012,2013, are
of interest as they represent the differences in average outcomes between the surgical
treated wards and the surgical control wards, from the pre to the post policy period
and with respect to the medical wards which are taken as the reference category. For
this model, we do not consider the health outcome returns to the surgery room as this
is observed only for the surgical wards.
Finally, in the results section, we also consider a similar model for the detection
of possible differences in the reaction to the P4P adoption depending on the type of
hospital ownership. In particular, we compare private for-profit, private not-for-profit
and public hospitals. Due to the more strict budget constrains for private hospitals,
these hospitals may react more actively to the policy than public ones. Furthermore,
private for-profit hospitals are more oriented towards profit than the other hospitals
and may therefore be more driven to increase their outcome measures in order to
obtain a financial reward.
5 Results
In this section, we use the models just described to evaluate the impact of the intro-
duction of the P4P policy in Lombardy. Table 2 reports the fixed effects estimates
of the model in equation (4). As all outcomes are constrained to be between 0 and 1,
the parameter estimates and the p-values are computed by a non-parametric bootstrap
approach. For this, we use a method specifically developed for multilevel modelling
(Wang et al, 2011, Carpenter et al, 2003). Table 2 shows how the parameters δ θ2011
of the interaction between TREATED and YEAR2011 are not significantly different
from zero. This provides evidence in favour of the parallel trend assumption for each
individual health outcome, i.e. the differences between the average outcome of the
treatment and control group are constant prior to the introduction of the policy. This
assumption is needed in order to evaluate the impact of the policy using a DID ap-
proach. As we require a parallel trend to be satisfied for all health outcomes simul-
taneously, we use a multivariate analysis of variance test (MANOVA) to test the null
hypothesis H0 : δ
(1)
2011 = . . . δ
(5)
2011 = 0 under the multivariate framework of model in
equation (4). The Wilks’ lambda statistics returns a p-value of 0.2676, which pro-
vides further evidence in support of the parallel trend assumption across all health
outcomes.
5.1 Do the hospitals react positively to the policy?
We are therefore in a position to evaluate the impact of the P4P policy by consider-
ing the estimates of the coefficients of the interaction between the treatment variable
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Table 2: Estimates for the fixed effects for the model in equation (4).
MORTALITY READMISSIONS RETURN TRANSFERS VOL. DISCH.
MONTHS 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
TREATED 0.02*** 0.004*** -0.037*** 0.006*** 0.001
[0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001]
YEAR2010 0.044*** 0.13*** 0.084*** 0.009*** 0.009***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002]
YEAR2011 0.044*** 0.125*** 0.082*** 0.008*** 0.008***
[0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.003] [0.003]
YEAR2012 0.045*** 0.122*** 0.021*** 0.006* 0.008**
[0.003] [0.003] [0.005] [0.003] [0.003]
YEAR2013 0.041*** 0.118*** 0.022*** 0.005 0.008**
[0.004] [0.004] [0.006] [0.004] [0.004]
TREATED·YEAR2011 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 -0.001
[0.001] [0.001] [0.003] [0.001] [0.001]
TREATED·YEAR2012 0.001 -0.005*** 0.026*** -0.005*** -0.001
[0.001] [0.001] [0.003] [0.001] [0.001]
TREATED·YEAR2013 0.005*** -0.011*** 0.025*** -0.005*** -0.001
[0.001] [0.001] [0.003] [0.001] [0.001]
The coefficients and standard errors (in brackets) are reported. *** represents significance at the 1% level, ** repre-
sents significance at the 5% level and * represents significance at the 10% level.
and the post-policy years, i.e. δ θ2012 and δ
θ
2013 in table 2. As all health outcomes are
improved if they are reduced, a significant and negative coefficient for these interac-
tions would mean that the P4P introduction has a positive effect on the hospital, by
improving the performance of the treated wards more than the untreated.
This result is confirmed for readmissions (δ2012=-0.0051, δ2013=-0.0112) and trans-
fers (δ2012=-0.0046, δ2013=-0.0047). This is a clear signal that the hospital activity
was modified as a result of the P4P introduction, as both readmissions and transfers
are directly affected by the hospital organization. In particular, the results show that
the P4P program may have reduced the hospital attitude of readmitting patients in
order to increase the number of the DRGs provided (Berta et al, 2010). The reduction
in the transfers of the patients between hospitals in the treated wards is also particu-
larly encouraging, considering that transfers are directly linked to the patient safety
and continuity of care.
In order to further quantify the impact of the policy and to confirm the significance
of the results on the health outcomes in absolute terms, figure 1 plots the marginal ef-
fects of each health outcome in equation (4) for treated and untreated wards and over
the observation period (Karaca-Mandic et al, 2012, Ai and Norton, 2003). As well as
verifying the parallel trend in the pre-policy period, the plots show a clear improve-
ment for readmissions and transfers. In particular, there is an absolute difference of
0.91% and 1.52% in the average number of readmissions between the treated and un-
treated wards in the year 2012 and 2013, respectively, and of 0.31% in the year 2011,
whereas there is a difference of 0.19% and 0.18% in the average number of transfers
between the treated and untreated wards in the year 2012 and 2013, respectively, and
of 0.72% in the year 2011. This leads to DID reductions of 0.59% (readmissions)
and 0.53% (transfers) in 2012 compared to 2011 and a further reduction of 0.61%
(readmissions) and 0.01% (transfers) in 2013. The predicted percentages of reduc-
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(a) Expected Mortality (b) Expected Readmissions
(c) Expected Returns to OR (d) Expected Transfers
(e) Expected Voluntary Discharges
Fig. 1: Marginal effects of all health outcomes per year and treatment for the model
in equation (4).
tion correspond to a P4P-related saving of 4,324 readmissions and 4,295 transfers
in the treated wards in 2012 and a further reduction of 4,871 readmissions and 157
transfers in 2013.
The picture for the other three health outcomes is more complex than for trans-
fers and readmissions. The average number of returns to the surgery room seems to
increase in the treated wards more than in the untreated after the introduction of the
policy, as δ2012 and δ2013 are positive and significant. This is shown in figure 1, which,
on the other hand, shows also how the P4P incentives improve the performance for
both the treated and untreated wards. This is an interesting result, suggesting that the
managerial impact in the hospital organization caused by the adoption of the P4P
program has changed the overall hospital performance with regards to the surgical
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activity.
For the other two health outcomes, voluntary discharges and mortality, the coeffi-
cients of δ2012 and δ2013 are not significantly different from zero. Figure 1 shows how
the number of voluntary discharges decreases already before the P4P introduction.
With regards to mortality, it is reasonable to believe that, when hospitals are checked
for effectiveness on more than one output, they will focus on those outcomes that are
easily measurable. This is observed by Propper et al (2008) in the context of a com-
petition analysis. From this point of view, readmissions, transfers and return to the
surgery room represent well-measured outcomes. Hence it is possible that hospitals
have focussed their efforts on those easily measured and better observable activities
in order to increase their performance and then gain financial rewards.
5.2 Do surgical and medical wards react differently to the policy?
We fit the model in equation (5) to the data in order to answer this question. The
results, omitted in full for brevity, show evidence of a differential impact of the P4P
introduction for the two health outcomes that were significant in the global analy-
sis above. In particular, there is evidence that the P4P program impacted more on
the medical wards than on the surgical ones in terms of number of readmissions
(τ2012=0.008, p-value=0.0102; τ2013=0.0307, p-value=<.0001) and number of trans-
fers (τ2012=0.0117, p-value=0.0002, τ2013=0.012, p-value=0.0001). This is shown vi-
sually also by the marginal effects in figure 2. This finding can be explained by the
fact that the surgical healthcare pathways are more rigorous and more linked to fixed
guidelines than those on medical hospitalizations, which instead tend to be more flex-
ible and more dependent on managerial actions and hospital organization.
(a) Expected Readmissions (b) Expected Transfers
Fig. 2: Marginal effects of readmissions and transfers per type of ward, year and
treatment for the model in equation (5).
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5.3 Do private and public hospitals react differently to the policy?
Previous studies have found no dependency between hospital ownership and effi-
ciency (Barbetta et al, 2007) or hospital ownership and competition (Berta et al,
2016), suggesting that the long term adoption of a quasi-market system in Lombardy
has reduced the expected differences between the hospital types.
In this paper, we test whether the hospitals reacted differently to the introduction
of the P4P policy, depending on their ownership. In order to answer this question,
we use a model like equation (5), but with SURGICAL replaced by a variable repre-
senting the ownership type (OWN), where public is taken as the reference category.
Once again, the interactions τ(θ)jk are of interest in this model. In line with the exist-
ing literature, the results show only limited evidence in support to a hypothesis of
a different reaction: apart from readmissions in 2012 (τ2012,not-for-profit=-0.01964,
p-value=0.0004; τ2012,private=-0.0096, p-value=0.0062), the interaction for readmis-
sions in 2013 and all interactions for transfers, for both the private for profit and
not-for-profit categories, are not statistically significant. This is an interesting result
meaning that the monetary incentive is an interesting motivation to improve the qual-
ity of care for all types of ownership and not only for the profit-maximizer providers
(profit hospitals).
6 Conclusions
The P4P approach has been adopted in many countries in order to encourage im-
provements in the quality of healthcare by supplying financial incentives to healthcare
providers. In this study, we evaluate the impact of a specific P4P program adopted in
the Lombardy region (Italy) in 2012. Differently to previous studies, we perform
the analysis considering the whole healthcare system and evaluating multiple health
outcomes over different clinical areas. We analyse data over four years, two before
(2010/2011) and two after (2012/2013) the implementation of the program. During
this period, a number of selected wards were subjected to the program and the remain-
ing wards were not. The fact that the selection of the wards for treatment was made
exogenously, combined with the fact that we observe a parallel trend pre-introduction
of the policy, have led us to use a DID approach for the evaluation of the impact of
the policy.
Our study shows that three out of the five health outcomes considered (namely
readmissions, transfers and returns to surgery room) support the hypothesis that the
P4P program improved the quality of healthcare. Two of the outcomes (discharges
against medical advice and mortality) did not show changes that can be attributed to
the P4P adoption. These findings suggest that the hospitals involved in the P4P pro-
gram may have focused their efforts on the outcomes which are more easily driven
by a managerial intervention in order to improve their performance and to obtain the
financial incentives. Moreover, our study shows that the medical wards have reacted
to the P4P program more strongly than the surgical wards, whereas only limited evi-
dence is found to suggest that the policy reaction was different across different types
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of hospital ownership. Overall, the results show that the healthcare system in Lom-
bardy was positively impacted by the P4P implementation, as anticipated by Castaldi
et al (2011): there is evidence of a reduction in some adverse health outcomes and
of a general change in the hospital organization in order to improve the healthcare
services provided to the citizens.
This study has some implications. Firstly, Lombardy should extend the adoption
of the P4P program across the whole regional healthcare system in order to improve
the overall hospital activity. Secondly, given the positive impact of the P4P program in
Lombardy, the adoption of a similar strategy is suggested to the other regional health-
care systems in Italy. This would stimulate improvements in quality for the regions
that already perform relatively well, but, in particular, this would be an important
incentive for these regions with a lower qualified healthcare system.
Future work on the evaluation of P4P programs could explore additional aspects.
First of all, it would be interesting to test the impact of the P4P program in terms of
the number of intra-hospital infections and complications, or other outcomes directly
related to the performance of the hospitals’ physicians, which were not available for
this study. Secondly, our analysis has focussed solely on the impact of the P4P pro-
grams on the hospital effectiveness. It would be interesting to extend the current anal-
ysis to understand whether the monetary incentive had an impact also on the hospital
efficiency and on the allocation of resources. Finally, we believe that further research
is needed to assess the impact of P4P programs over a long time frame, as encouraged
by Werner et al (2011). This would also highlight possible unintended consequences
of the P4P implementation, such as spillover effects and gaming behaviour.
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